No.60

<The individual and intersubjective surrounding worlds as aspects of the one world being thought in all surrounding worlds. Real world relatedness in the form of real intentionality>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> The world “in itself” given only as a surrounding world. Communication of the individual surrounding worlds to the intersubjective “surrounding world”. – Theoretical and practical world relatedness. – World givenness of the surrounding world in verification and accordance, correlative in non-verification and discrepancy.*

*The naturalistic-modern apprehension of the man as inductive-causal [conception]. “Personalistic attitude”. Intentional causality.*

<§1. The being related to the being world in the form of the relatedness to a respective surrounding world>

Human life world, world of persons. Their surrounding world is that which is consciously being for me, respectively perceived by me, remembered, pre-expected, thought of and rethought, desired, sought, treated world – the world in which I live and act as ego, in which I am affected in sensation and emotion, by which I suffer – the world, in which my egoical causality, in which my acting and suffering as ego finds its counter-members each of which is conscious to me (may it be as something not known to me more closely, only partially determined within the how of its consistencies, etc.), but conscious as **something different** than me, who I am. Everything I know of **the** world, simply is **surrounding world**; and insofar as I know of the world as universe, world pure and simple and universe coincide. But it needs to be heeded that I simply indeed have the undetermined general conception of the world, the undetermined general way of the cognition of its being, but thereby only a horizon of objects being experienced in a relative determined way and being known to me, coming into consciousness <and> above that only a quite **[682]** undetermined potentiality of the being-able-to-further-experience, etc. The **surrounding world** for me thus designates a changeable **subjective mode of consciousness of the being world as being conscious for me** within the process of my conscious life. And likewise everyone has his and again his changeable surrounding world, related to the world which we have accepted in advance as continuously pre-given, when searching for objective world cognition, and especially therein cognition of the human personalities and of the human cultural world.

The world, always presupposed as being and as at least cognizable in grades of perfection, is the one **being in itself**. That which each of us experiences as world, thinks, means, has been given as the world in which he lives is his surrounding world, to which the open horizon of cognition like the practical horizon belongs respectively. Within the change of the surrounding world, happening for me and for each ego itself consciously, the same world is experienced, of which the respective surrounding world is the respective aspect. But each content the world has, coming from former surrounding worlds (each of which is the one being accepted by me, being for me at the moment), everything that does not become further accepted knowledge as contentual knowledge (within the cognizance) – which is always the case -, but remains unbroken in this further acceptance and ever again is received or can be received as being, **this only belongs to the surrounding world**. It is a being world, within me from former subjective world aspects, having arisen from former acceptances and further acceptances, and it has its stamp “for the time being”. Within communication my world aspects combine with those of the others, and within the univocality of the general experience and of the common consciousness always a world identical for us all (and horizonlike for those currently known and unknown others not being communalized with us) constitutes itself, as being accepted by us all, contentually gaining sense from us. **But also this intersubjective world is a surrounding world**, not my personal-private one, but simply the conscious world being related to the respective groups of people, and their possibly undetermined horizons (e.g. we cultural men – our surrounding world).

The persons in singularity and <in> community are men, bodily-psychic beings within the world. But at the same time they are <conscious> as **[683]** ego-subjects of their organisms and of all other things, of themselves as ego-subjects and of all other subjects, <they are> as men conscious of other men, and thus generally of the world which is there, experiencing it, treating it, etc. By being there for each other consciously, a surrounding world being common to them is there as well, the core of which is the intuitional [world] in any case, the one being intuitional for them in community, being equipped with common experiential (intuitional) determinations. In this world being for them all cultural acting happens as acting into the world – into their surrounding world.

It now needs to be heeded that every single man and each communicating community (each ego and each we) is only related to the world, and can respectively be related by way of being related to his <or rather their> surrounding world. This relation which is not only a relation of experiential cognition, but practical <relation> creating something worldly by acting, essentially can proceed now in continuous univocality, but now thus that the accordance is broken in the form of discordance. This means for the stream of world experience continuously belonging to the ego as living in a wakeful way (and likewise for that of the we), that for the single and communalized subjectivity something worldly is only intuitionally there as intuitionally actual, and likewise is accepted as having been there and going to be there <only> as long, that is, that some actual worldly being is only there for it as long as no discordances emerge and demand in the form of the experiential “void” the abandonment of the actuality as being thought in the wrong way.

Thus the relation to the world in the form of the surrounding world is not without further ado such a one, in which the subjectivity of consciousness takes the true being of the world itself, its “in itself” with the corresponding contents of determination being true in themselves, into its cognitional possession.[[2]](#footnote-2) Nay, even more. Not only does each surrounding world in its relative accordance de facto miss – as the process of the synthetic combination with the new surrounding worlds shows – the true being in manifold ways, but this possibility is <also> always an open one. Now certainly **[684]** this experience of nothingness is only a relative fact merely of the surrounding world, but anyway all experiential knowledge, and world knowledge respectively to be based on that, exclusively rests on the relation happening within the consciousness life of the ego to a world being accepted as being; but simply this acceptance is only relative and this accepted world [is] always subjectively relative surrounding world, although, like it remains being presupposed as a matter of course, a world in itself evinces itself within it. This presupposition is not a theoretical, historical-de facto prejudgment, but it belongs to the essential sense of everybody’s world experience. We do not consider here the possibility whether the accordance could not straightforwardly change into a jumble of discordancies; we just stick to the discordancies possibly emerging at each point of the surrounding world, and often enough have emerged unexpectedly. We can and we must for the clarification of this matter of course essentially belonging to the experiencing life also point to all changing of the surrounding world *de facto* having happened up till now in the form of the correction, and therefore will supposedly happen, and that therefore such a synthetic unity goes through all changings of the surrounding world that within an unbreakable and continuously strengthened experiential conviction the being world is as the one in detail having failed in former aspects of the surrounding world, but still <just as far, that> through the following corrections <and> through <their> back transfer into the former “apprehensions of the world”, the former being of the world and its lasting being <is> confirmed, like on the other hand the unbreakable foresight <is> awakened – unbreakable, as long as the vivid experiential stream gets this style of unity by way of correction -, that in all future surrounding worlds the presupposition of the world being in future like being up till now will confirm itself as unity of the world manifestation certainly keeping itself within all changings of the surrounding world. **[685]**

<§2. Right and the limit of the naturalistic concept of man. The consciousness relation of the human ego to the world as a real relation>

Let us apply this. Every I and we in its conscious life relation to its surrounding world is certain of being related to the world, to real actualities, and within real relations, namely in relations of acting and suffering. In detail this may be an illusion, but never as a whole. And even if we take the common life one has to say: The certainty of experience of the world’s being from which we presuppose the existence of the world <in> all our scientific examinations, is equivalent to the experiential certainty that we are affected by the world by way of the surrounding world, and that we influence the world on our own accord by acting as ego-subjects. This second certainty is implied within the first one and the other way round.

The man is within the world. Let us analyze the essential sense of the world being implied as idea within each shape of the surrounding world. We thereby go back to the experience, the actual and possible experience, as measure for all respective other opinions. Elaboration of the meant along horizons in possible experience which would complement the actual experience in accordance. Then we gain a “concept” of the current surrounding world, and we see that every such elaborating “concept” and furthermore every conceivable surrounding world in all its possible elaborations gets a structure of identity, an **“aesthetic” essential form**. It designates that which we of course and necessarily in any case can say of the world which is accepted by us.

This is a spatio-temporal world, a world of realities, external of each other. Mutually interwoven within the mutual externality through **external causality**. Every physical reality according to a core. All physical realities combined to the unity of the all-nature in which governs the real form of relation of external causality (usually only being called thus). We can also say “inductive causality”, since all causal cognition is only possible here as being inductive and this *a priori*. One may now be prone to go on thus: To the mutual externality, encompassing all relations of spatio-temporal co-existence (and inclusive succession) also the mutual externality **[686]** within man belongs as co-existence of bodily organism and “soul”. And then also the “psycho-physical” external causality belongs to the real connection in the form of the external causality, provided that we may rightfully and from experience assume for the “mental side” of the man that it is spatio-temporally there where the bodily organism is, and that this co-existence like that on the purely physical side has everywhere at least at the same time a connection through external, inductive causality.

This concept of the man becomes the traditional **naturalistic** [concept] of the modern times as a whole if it presents itself as the whole truth, that is, if it believes to be able to perfectly and exclusively satisfy the experiential sense of the man. No other concept seems to come into question for it [the concept]. The attitude in which the world is considered, that is, the naturalistic one, sees, following the experiential givenness of the world to a certain measure, the world as universe of all realities in its essentially necessary form of the spatio-temporal mutual externality and <in> the form of connection of the external, inductive causality. The view towards physical nature, the essential kind of which is the causal one, the real connection of which is produced by real external causality, prevails according to the preponderance of modern natural science being thus successful. For external consideration being directed to the regulation of the co-existence as order of spatio-temporality by way of inductive causality, indeed the consideration of physical nature is the first in itself. But natural science in the first sense extends; the world in general is considered in the extended sense **by way of natural science**, **externally**, **inductively**. All natural cognition is based upon induction. – Thus the view’s attitude is directed towards the inductive. All real relation here is a spatio-temporal co-existence regulated by law – thus the view in general is pointed at the objective co-existence. Accordingly the scheme of a regulated co-existence of something physical and psychical is made the base for the exploration of the man as to the organism and soul and their unity in advance and like a matter of course as alone coming into question, [the scheme] of a causal regulation not only within physical nature and especially with regard to the bodiliness, but also between this and the “soul”, being grasped as analogon of the physical spatio-temporal unity. It is **[687]** considered thereby and the thought of an inner psychic causality is often championed, again in the form of an external causality, an inductive one.

But if we are not **naturalistically blinded** and follow the principle to let us be given the lead coming from original experience itself and from the indwelling experiential sense, then we will have to ask first of all what the experience of the man’s mental being (and mediately then of the animals) teaches us concerning the **experiential sense of this mental thing**, and in how far real relations also and inseparably belong to it. Indeed we find “causalities” between the mental of the man, his concrete ego and any realities being titled “not-ego”. We ask what kind of causalities these are, and whether they are not quite different ones than the external causalities of nature which express mere regulations of the co-existence.

Well, in this regard that which is needed is essentially already stated. The peculiar essence of the human ego is to “relate” to the world by way of the medium (a dangerous word!) of his surrounding world, in detail sometimes erring, but as a whole to actually relate to the actually being world (always presupposed by us). Within the objective consideration of the man, considering it as theoretical observer and critique, and judging it rationally on the basis of our experiences we have of them, we often enough judge their illusions, their mythical conceptions, their manifold errings with regard to the world, to which they are related. But we would never arrive at abandoning this, their being related to the **world**, since we are ourselves, although we contrast them as their judge of truth and wrongfulness, necessarily in community with them, and we are this only by presupposing as unitary We which encompasses them a common world and by finding it undeniably accepted through common experience, to which all our surrounding worlds, among them our judgmental one, are related – we are just thinking that the latter one, possibly by way of special methodical primacies of our cognizing, could serve as norm.

Accordingly that real relation shows itself as belonging to the basic essence of the single-human like common subjectivity **[688]** which we called the **conscious relation** of the human ego to the other world realities. It is not only some relating oneself of the ego-subjects to something real, but a **real relation** is produced, in this point being analogous to the external causal one. The ego-subject, the way it experiences in a multiple way and then supposes due to experiential reasons, is **affected** by real objects. And again: It **has an impact** by itself on the non-egoical real things.

The ego-subject experiences itself and also experiences the real “I, this man”, experiences other real things, by which it knows itself to be affected, to which it bears a relationship in this or that way, re-shapes them in this or that way – and experiences these real things as being external to the real “I man”. It thus experiences – in everyday life -, that it works beyond its spatio-temporal being towards the outside, into the world being bodily and humanly external to it, but here within a working which is **egoical working**, an “intentional” working, and not a working within natural external causality.

The surrounding world is thereby always also experienced as real world within its natural structure, its mutual externality, and the causalities of the mutual externality (only thereby man knows, and we all know of such things), and in such a way that a consequent pursuit of these external relations can be exerted, and eventually natural science and any kind of inductive world regard can be grounded or – which is the same – every kind of consideration, in which consequently the inductive causality showing itself intuitionally within experience itself is pursued, and thereby also an external causal peculiarity is found for natural objects, for men. But if we reflect upon subjects, upon our own and all other men’s <subject-being>, then that which characterizes them as ego-subjects in a basically essential way, that is, actually in the first place, the real world relatedness in the form of **real intentionality**.

If we call the attitude towards the human ego, towards the persons and the personal world of working (the cultural world) the **personal or socio-cultural** one, then we instantly see that the **universal theme** here is **completely different** from nature and generally the world within mutual externality and induction, the external causality, rather simply the **mind** as that which mentally, intentionally works into its intentional surrounding world and is affected <by it>, as that which governs within the organism, subjectively treats other things through vivid governing, **[689]** etc.[[3]](#footnote-3) And, as has been said earlier: The man has a **personal “substantiality”** therein; he is a lasting substrate of characteristics, of personal habitualities, habits, possibilities as lasting for their part. Each expresses an intentional-causal peculiarity, a peculiarity in doing and suffering, action and affection, designated in short, be it just as index for a field of research.

Appendix LIII

Pregiven world within life and true world[[4]](#footnote-4)

Human life in its naturalness is world life, and this means within common word sense: living into the world which is pregiven to us in each moment of our awake life, and pregiven in continuing experience, pregiven as constantly being within our visual field, already conscious as being prior to grasping experiencing, stimulating our attentive ego, in a certain way inviting us to now notice this of it, now that, to realize it, to pay attention to it in conspicuous attention, to occupy ourselves with it in these or those ways of behavior, which are all modes of ego-acts, actions of the ego-consciousness. Thus always the world is consciously **pregiven** to us, and always natural life consists in being affected by this pregiven <world> and in being determined to activities (in the widest sense). The concrete fact of life implies this basic differentiation between the ego, the identical ego of the life, being as ego within its egoical ways of behavior, of the being touched by something, being excited, awakened, affected, concerned, in short: being affected, and consequently of the doing, the actively-behaving in manifold modes. But suffering from something, being actively occupied by something again implies this something. **The world life implies within its life itself the world**, the manifold and still unified being world objects as simply those disturbing me, touching me, arousing my interest, etc. That which I do not meet myself within my life, that which I am not conscious of, this is not there for me as ego; as the saying goes: “What the eye does not see, **[690]** the heart does not grieve over.” Of course, this “knowledge” is not to be understood as grounded natural-scientifically. And thus it is clear that the world being pre-given to me or us in community life as mine or rather our [world], and then consciously given as being thus and thus, by our taking it by way of paying attention into it, the way it shows itself to us from the pre-givenness, - I say: it is clear that this conscious world is the world subjectively appearing to us in this or that way, being accepted by us in this or that way. We can only question the respective consciousness itself as to what it is, that is, at to what it is as being conscious; and the answer gives us an acting of simple explication which analyzes how the world appears to us (and the special objects showing themselves to us), and is accepted [by us]. Thus it is obvious that this world is not that which we understand under the title “being in truth” in contrast to all subjectively changing appearances and opinions of the being world. Certainly, in every point of time or, more concisely, in every current present in which I speak of the world in life, and likewise we within the communalized togetherness, simply the world being itself in view within our life is accepted by us as the world, and with the determinations by which it does that and exactly thereby is accepted by us in certainty. But if we stick to the content of acceptance of the current life we find ourselves within change and relativism never keeping still. Then constantly something else is entitled as “world”. But at the same time – as soon as we become aware of it – we are still certain that there is one single identical true world purely and simply; and it is **this** one towards which science is directed with its peculiar thought activities stepping out of natural practical life: To determine them theoretically is the scientific task.

But for the understanding of human life and of science itself in all its basic shapings it is of the utmost importance to also provide that subjective-relative concept of the world with its right, and to first of all distinguish clearly: 1) **the true, objective world**, being in and by itself, and being thus in the sense of the objective world sciences, and 2) **that of the respective subjectivity, being respectively conscious without any thoughts of science and its set goals**, respectively experienced and otherwise subjectively meant, being accepted as world by subjectivity in its consciousness purely and simply as world – in this regard we speak of a **subjective surrounding world** or simply of surrounding world. It is the world within the subjective life itself, the life-world we could say, to which thus the gods of the heretic belong, whom the Christian, the Muslim and <the> Jew calls “idols” since they do not appear as accepted actuality within his surrounding world. **The surrounding world is the world of the Heraclitean stream**. My life-present, the present being conscious itself within this life **[691]** continuously finds itself within a stream, and together with it the world itself streams, which is the one of my life, the one being accepted by me, constantly determining me in affection and action.

Appendix LIV

<Relativism of the world life: to experience the one world in the form of a constantly changing surrounding world. The task of a transcendental aesthetic>[[5]](#footnote-5)

Not only in an empiric-factual way we may ask: “Which types do we find there?”, but also: “Which necessary structural set of types goes through all such changings?”. If a world as such shall be experienceable as a communal one, if e.g. a Zulu and a Chinese man and a German meet and shall now be able to have the experiential consciousness of the same world, of the same things, men, mountains, buildings, etc. – like they de facto have -, which is a **necessary content**, that is, in a double meaning: 1) necessary content of structures for that which is experienced as the **world** thereby, with all individual difference of grasping, and 2) necessary content of **subjective modes of givenness** which in the widest grasping implies a) subjective modes, without which no thing, no real thing, no world in general can appear, b) those necessities belonging to the “randomly” changing intuitions, grasping, namely as a possibly necessary, apriori, and formal set of types of possible differences providing the same world with a different sense in different groups of men (nations, classes, etc.), which mutually cannot be taken over, possibly cannot be understood, and, if it is understood, cannot be accepted (myth, metaphysical substruction, etc). It also needs to be considered here that, if the “same” world is there for all men being together in a community of communication, still again not everything which is there for the one can be there for the other one as well – the way he is and [the way he] is an experiencing subject. Thus for the Zulu that which we know and experience <as> sciences, scientific works, <as> literature, as books, newspapers, etc., simply is not there, although books are there as things and possibly as things being afflicted with these and those spells – with which interpretations they again are not there for us. If we take that which shows itself within experience in a **[692]** subjective univocal way or for a historical community in a national, socially univocal way as belonging to the concrete experiential world of this humanity, then we need to say: Every such humanity has another concrete world. But still – through all these concrete worlds, which we call its “surrounding worlds” as being community-subjective-relative in this way, a world runs, that is as <a> [world] emerging directly from experience as the same, that is consciously, within the combining experiential consciousness of such subjectivities entering a communal relationship, or rather, of single subjects. Only that which the ones contentually call being proven by experience and actually being thus, according to this or that determination of the content is called superstitious, foolish mythology etc. by the others and vice versa.

Accordingly the task which we call **ontology**, or rather **phenomenology** **of the aesthetic world** is understood. Based on a purely transcendental standpoint this is a **transcendental aesthetic**, a transcendental ontology and phenomenology of the world. The expression “ontology” relates to the being world itself, being as being univocally experienced for the respective subjectivity, the expression “phenomenology” [relates] to the correlative and therefore more concrete research considering the being according to all subjective modes, whereby it shall never be forgotten that the ontological as well means something subjective here.

Which apriori structures thus belong to an experiential world, which we purely consider as the one within a univocally experiencing humanity (to which by definition we also count the communalization) – shall be able to consider? Which apriori structures do those changing multiplicities have, namely those ever new experiences themselves, in the sense of changing ways of appearance of the same, of changing subjective grasping and modalities of being, with which the same is experienced and necessarily needs to be experienced (or can be judged differently according to a necessary possibility)? The exploration thus concerns that which the subjects distinguish as their subjective we from the objects, from the world as such – without which though no world can be there for us.

From this consideration we learn that within our whole life, which is constantly a world life, we are caught in a **highly peculiar relativism** and necessarily need to remain caught. Our world-life – living into the respective world – always posits as being experienced, as being immediately and directly given (being there originally) “the” world as that which is given indeed within the evident consciousness of the objective selfness through the universal stream of experience. But it posits – and it cannot help it – “the” world **in the form of a constantly changing surrounding world**. Concerning the question, as to what the world is, what I do find there as being under this title, I can only point to that which has just been experienced, which shows itself to me **[693]** within perception as being in bodily selfness. But this is something completely relative, this is that which from direct experience is accepted as being within the respective subjectivity and present, in one word, the accepted surrounding world of the respective subjectivity which is another one for another subjectivity, but also for the same in different times. But this while every other subjectivity becomes very well conscious of this difference, and at the same time of the continuous acceptance of something identical through all these changes.

1. 1928. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This is not sufficient. We have to distinguish between the merely being thought and <the> actual being within each surrounding world. Surrounding world itself as being already has a relative truth (truth of situation); and thus it remains until no other goal for the truth has accrued. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Intentional causality. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Possibly at the end of the 1920’s. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Possibly end of the 1920’s. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)